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THE DA VIS GOOD FAITH RULE
AND
GETTING ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS JONES LEFT OPEN
Susan Freiwald
The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Jones clearly
established that use of GPS tracking surveillance constitutes a
search under the Fourth Amendment. But the Court left many
other questions unanswered about the nature and scope of the
constitutional privacy right in location data. A review of lower
court decisions in the wake of Jones reveals that, rather than
beginning to answer the questions that Jones left open, courts are
largely avoiding substantive Fourth Amendment analysis of
location data privacy. Instead, these courts are finding that
officers who engaged in GPS tracking and related surveillance
operated in good faith, based on the new exception to the
exclusionary remedy that the Supreme Court laid out in the 2011
case of Davis v. United States. When courts narrowly apply the
Davis rule, they deny suppression remedies and avoid new Fourth
Amendment analysis when binding appellate precedent specifically
authorized the investigation. That approach will cease to be
controlling as soon as courts consider surveillance investigations
taking place after the Jones decision issued. When courts apply
the Davis rule broadly, however, they deny the exclusionary
remedy based on the culpability of the investigating officer or even
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more amorphous criteria. If broad applications persist, it will take
a very long time indeed to get answers to the questions Jones left
open. During that time, the constitutional right to privacy in
location data will remain undeveloped and unprotected.
I. INTRODUCTION
When all nine Justices of the Supreme Court disapproved of
the Government's use of warrantless Global Positioning System
("GPS") tracking surveillance in United States v. Jones,' it seemed
to be a clear indication that the Court was ready to limit law
enforcement's use of new surveillance technologies. Importantly,
the Court did not accept the Government's invitation to view the
use of hidden GPS tracking devices, which transmit fairly precise
geographic information about the real-time location of a target's
car to remote monitoring stations, the same as visual surveillance
by agents in the field.2 The Justices also appeared prepared to
recognize that the precedents from the 1980s,' established in cases
in which much more primitive radio beepers had merely indicated
to tracking agents that they were getting closer, did not govern the
dramatically more sophisticated GPS tracking surveillance at issue
in Jones.4 The Jones decision seemed to be a significant win for
privacy and for Fourth Amendment rights.
But the Jones decision was anything but definitive. Because
Justice Scalia's majority opinion relied on a trespass theory to find
that the GPS tracking surveillance was a search, it provided no rule
to govern cases that lacked the physical trespass element.' The
1 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
2 Id. at 952; Reply Brief for the United States, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (No. 10-
1259), 2011 WL 5094951, at *5-6.
3 See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983); United States v. Karo, 468
U.S. 705 (1984).
4 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 951 (rejecting the Government's argument that the
reasoning of the "beeper" cases "foreclose[s] the conclusion that what occurred
here is a search"); id. at 952 n.6 (describing early beeper use as more limited
than GPS tracking).
' Id. at 954 ("It may be that achieving the same result through electronic
means, without an accompanying trespass, is an unconstitutional invasion of
privacy, but the present case does not require us to answer that question.").
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majority allowed that the reasonable expectation of privacy test
would govern GPS surveillance cases that lack the physical
attachment of a device such as the one police had installed on
Jones's car, but it neither accepted nor rejected the concurrence's
prolonged surveillance test.' Nor did the majority express an
opinion on the mosaic theory that the D.C. Court of Appeals had
used to find the surveillance unlawful in the case below.'
Therefore, as Walter Dellinger explained, the majority's rule was a
"temporary solution."' As Justice Sotomayor recognized in her
concurrence, the majority's trespass approach covers neither
location data tracking by use of cell phone tower data, which is
now common, nor use of remote access to GPS devices in cars and
phones, which is becoming increasingly common.' The majority
opinion did not even establish whether police need to obtain an
order from a judge prior to engaging in GPS tracking surveillance,
and if so, whether they need to establish probable cause or some
lesser standard such as reasonable suspicion.
By raising at least as many questions as it answered, the Jones
decision offered a perfect opportunity to develop Fourth
Amendment law in the age of modem location tracking. While
some commentators excitedly expressed the hope that the Supreme
6 The majority opinion did express skepticism about the concurrence's
approach. See infra note 23.
7 See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, Ill
MICH. L. REv. 311, 329-354 (2012) (arguing that courts should reject the
"mosaic theory" largely because it poses extremely difficult implementation
questions); Christopher Slobogin, Making the Most of United States v. Jones in a
Surveillance Society: A Statutory Implementation of Mosaic Theory, 8 DUKE J.
CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 1 (2012); see also United States v. Jones, No. 05-0386
(ESH), 2012 WL 6443136, at *6 & n. 11 (D.D.C. Dec. 14, 2012) (discussing the
"mosaic theory" and noting its use in lower court decisions that addressed cell
site location surveillance prior to Jones).
8 Walter Dellinger, Keynote Address at the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology Symposium: U.S. v. Jones: Defining a Search in the 21st Century
(Jan. 25, 2013), available at http://ncjolt.org/multimedia/symposium-videos.
9 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("With increasing
regularity, the Government will be capable of duplicating the monitoring
undertaken in this case by enlisting factory-or owner-installed vehicle
tracking devices or GPS-enabled smartphones.").
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Court would soon revisit the issues it had raised in Jones, cooler
heads surely recognized that would not happen until the lower
courts had spent some time percolating those issues. After all, the
Supreme Court had not addressed location tracking since the
1980s,'o and it arguably had not engaged the question of new
technological surveillance methods since the 2001 Kyllo v. United
States" decision.
Just one year prior to the Jones decision, however, the Court
had thrown a considerable hurdle in the path of Fourth Amendment
law development. In Davis v. United States, 2 the Court had
announced a new "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule
under which a suppression remedy is not available when officers
act in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate
precedent, even when the Supreme Court later overturns that
precedent. 3 Following Davis, lower courts are refusing to grant a
suppression remedy on appeal to targets of searches that were
almost surely unconstitutional under Jones. In determining
whether to apply the Davis rule, lower courts are looking backward
to prior appellate case law to see if it provides the basis for
reasonable reliance by the investigators who conducted the GPS
tracking surveillance, rather than looking forward to apply Jones.14
That in itself represents a missed opportunity for lower courts to
apply Jones and begin to answer some of the questions it left
unanswered. It should cease to be reasonable to rely on pre-Jones
appellate precedent, however, when defendants begin challenging
searches conducted after issuance of the Jones decision in January
of 2012. The inhibition of Fourth Amendment law development,
and the delay in obtaining answers to the questions left open by
Jones, should be time-limited.
10 See supra note 3.
" Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
12 Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011).
" Id. at 2423-24, 2429.
14 See infra Part IV.A. Some courts are analyzing the standing doctrine
notwithstanding their application of the Davis exception to the exclusionary
rule. See infra Part V.A.
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More troubling for both law development and Fourth
Amendment rights are the lower court decisions that read Davis
more expansively. Many such courts, using language from Davis
and from Herring v. United States," upon which Davis relies, are
denying an exclusionary remedy and refusing to engage in any
meaningful analysis of Jones even in the absence of binding
appellate precedent in their circuits. Those courts are either
looking to precedent in other circuits to justify GPS tracking and
related surveillance, or are engaging in a cost-benefit analysis that
ties the availability of a suppression remedy to the culpability of
the officers' conduct.'6 By untethering their analysis from binding
appellate precedent altogether, some courts are using Davis to deny
both an exclusionary remedy and an analysis of Jones in ways that
threaten to severely limit Jones's impact far into the future. 7
When Davis was pending in the Supreme Court, Orin Kerr,
acting as a lawyer for Davis, argued in his briefs and in an
accompanying law review article that the Davis rule would shrink
the exclusionary remedy, provide a disincentive to bring cases, and
stunt the development of Fourth Amendment law." Despite those
warnings, and against a dissent that raised the same concerns,
when the Supreme Court issued the new good faith rule in Davis, it
dismissed any concerns about the new rule's impact on the
development of Fourth Amendment law. ' A review of lower court
opinions issued in the year since the Supreme Court decided Jones
shows that Professor Kerr's and the dissent's concerns have been
borne out.
15 Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009).
6 See infra Part IV.B.
'7 See infra Part IV.C.
18 Orin Kerr, Fourth Amendment Remedies and Development of the Law, A
Comment on Carnreta v. Greene and Davis v. United States, CATO SUP. CT.
REv., 2010-2011, at 237, 239, 248-61; Reply Brief for the Petitioner, Davis,
131 S. Ct. 2419 (No. 09-11328), 2011 WL 805225, at *15-21. In fact, in an
earlier paper as well Professor Kerr had argued in favor of a suppression remedy
when agents rely on overturned law. See Orin S. Kerr, Good Faith, New Law,
and the Scope of the Exclusionary Rule, 99 GEO. L.J. 1077 (2011).
'9 See infra Part III.C.
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Part II of this Article elaborates on the questions that the Jones
opinions left unanswered. While Jones significantly advanced
modem privacy rights, its opinions raised several questions about
the scope and application of the Fourth Amendment right to
privacy in location data. Part III reviews the Supreme Court's
decision in Davis and explains how the Court reconciled the denial
of a suppression remedy for newly announced rules of
constitutional law with current law that purports to accord full
retroactivity for such rules to cases pending at the time the rules
are announced. It reviews the narrow and broad readings of the
Davis decision. Part IV describes some of the methods courts are
using to avoid analyzing Jones based on Davis. It illustrates that
government litigators are aggressively pushing for a broad reading
of the Davis exception to the exclusionary rule and achieving
considerable success. That is unfortunate for defendants seeking a
remedy for the violation of their Fourth Amendment rights as well
as for the development of Fourth Amendment law. Part V
describes how a very few courts are answering some of the
questions raised by the Jones decision despite the Davis decision
and offers a glimpse of what the legal landscape would look like
post-Jones if the cloud of Davis did not hang over it. The Article
concludes that a broad reading of the Davis rule threatens to keep
the decisions answering the questions raised by Jones few and far
between, potentially long into the future.
II. QUESTIONS THE JUSTICES LEFT UNANSWERED IN JONES
The Jones opinions united in their opposition to the warrantless
GPS tracking surveillance agents had conducted. Yet the Justices
came to no consensus on a rule for future cases involving the
surveillance of location data.
A. Questions Raised by the Scalia Majority Opinion
A majority of five Justices found the installation and use of the
GPS tracking device to be a search under the Fourth Amendment
346 [VOL. 14: 341
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on the basis of a previously discredited trespass theory.20 In doing
so, the majority reinvigorated the importance of property rights to
the Fourth Amendment analysis, although the car at issue in Jones
was personal property rather than the real property of a home that
had previously been the focal point of the property-rights-based
view of Fourth Amendment protections. 2 1 Although the majority
accepted the possibility that a defendant could continue to lodge a
Fourth Amendment challenge based on the reasonable expectation
of privacy test when the trespass theory would not suffice, it did
not elaborate on what that claim would look like or what test
should be used.22 Without offering something better, the majority
expressed disapproval of the concurrences' distinction between
20 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 960 (2012) (Alito, J.,
concurring) ("The premise that property interests control the right of the
Government to search and seize has been discredited." (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
21 See, e.g., Peter Swire, Katz is Dead, Long Live Katz, 102 MICH. L. REV.
904, 913 (2004) (describing the focus on the home as part of the property rights
approach to Fourth Amendment rights).
22 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953 ("Situations involving merely the transmission of
electronic signals without trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis."
(citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967))). The author signed onto and
helped to draft a brief for law professors that argued that the Court should use a
four factor test to decide when there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in
location data, which may be subject to surveillance with or without a physical
trespass. See Brief of Amici Curiae, Yale Law School Information Society
Project Scholars and Other Experts in the Law of Privacy and Technology in
Support of the Respondent, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (No. 10-1259), 2011 WL
4614429, at *34 (citing Susan Freiwald, First Principles of Communications
Privacy, 2007 STAN. TECH. L. REv. 3 (2007); Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone
Location Data and the Fourth Amendment: A Question of Law, Not Fact, 70
MD. L. REv. 681 (2001) [hereinafter Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data]); see
also David Gray & Danielle Citron, A Technology-Centered Approach to
Quantitative Privacy (Aug. 14, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/paperscfm?abstract id=2129439 (putting forth
another new test for determining whether an investigative method constitutes a
Fourth Amendment search).
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short-term and long-term surveillance and its identification of the
severity of the offense under investigation as a significant factor.23
The majority did not elaborate on how the reasonable
expectation of privacy test would apply to claims based on
surveillance using cell site location data.2 4 Nor did the majority
discuss whether defendants could raise claims based on remote
trespasses to their physical effects, despite the fact that both
concurring decisions raised that issue,25 and despite the fact that a
series of cases have recognized the validity of claims of trespass by
electrons in applying the tort of trespass to chattels in the internet
age.26 The majority also failed to dispel concerns that the
intricacies and variations of state property law rules would overly
complicate its property-based approach. Writing for four
concurring Justices, Justice Alito raised those concerns as part of a
multi-pronged attack on the majority's trespass-based approach.27
Finally, because the Government forfeited the issue by not
raising it at trial, the majority did not address what procedural
hurdle investigative agents would have to surmount to conduct
reasonable searches by GPS tracking surveillance in the future.2 8
The majority did not affirmatively hold that agents would have to
obtain a warrant by establishing probable cause to a neutral
magistrate before engaging in GPS tracking surveillance. In fact,
23 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954 ("What of a 2-day monitoring of a suspected
purveyor of stolen electronics? Or of a 6-month monitoring of a suspected
terrorist? We may have to grapple with these 'vexing problems' in some future
cases. . . but there is no reason for rushing forward to resolve them here.").
24 See infra Part IV.C for a discussion of a case in which the defendant argued
that the Jones reasoning applied to cell site location data; see also Brief of
Amicus Curiae Susan Freiwald in Support of Affirmance, In re Applications of
the United States of America for Historical Cell-Site Data, No. 11-20884 (5th
Cir. Mar. 16, 2012), 2012 WL 1029814.
25 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id at 962 (Alito,
J., concurring).
26 See id at 962 (Alito, J., concurring) (discussing prior cases).
27 See id at 959-63 (Alito, J., concurring).
28 Id. at 954 (considering the argument "forfeited" that either reasonable
suspicion or probable cause, without a warrant, sufficed to make the search
reasonable and lawful).
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the majority did not explicitly require probable cause at all, which
left the door open for government lawyers to argue that merely
establishing reasonable suspicion suffices to justify GPS tracking
surveillance post-Jones, even though such surveillance constitutes
a search under the Fourth Amendment.29
B. Questions Raised by the Alito Concurrence
While Justice Alito's concurrence more explicitly incorporated
a reasonable expectation of privacy analysis into its reasoning, it
also left several questions unanswered. The Alito concurrence
found that the GPS tracking at issue exceeded the scope of Jones'
reasonable expectations, but it failed to set forth a test that could
easily be used to decide future cases. The concurrence found
significant that the GPS tracking proceeded over the course of
twenty-eight days, during which time agents were able to "secretly
monitor and catalogue every single movement of an individual's
car for a very long period."3 0 The concurring Justices determined
that "the use of longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of
most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy."' The
concurring Justices did not, however, "identify with precision the
point at which the tracking of this vehicle became a search, for the
line was surely crossed before the four-week mark."3 2  The
concurrence did not explain which "extraordinary offenses" would
fall outside the rule it announced, or the implications of doing so.
Presumably, surveillance falling short of prolonged surveillance or
conducted to investigate extremely serious offenses might proceed
free of the warrant requirement, but perhaps there would be some
other procedural hurdle such as reasonable suspicion or even
29 Government lawyers have argued in the alternative that agents may install
and monitor GPS devices so long as they have probable cause to do so, without
the need to obtain a warrant. See, e.g., United States v. Ford, No. 1:11 -CR-42,
2012 WL 5366049, at *7 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 30, 2012) ("The government ...
urges the Court to adopt the R & R [denying the motion to suppress] on the
ground attaching a GPS device to a vehicle with probable cause does not require
a warrant.").
30 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
3' Id.
32 Id.
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probable cause but without the need for a prior warrant. Perhaps
agents would instead have to justify their search after the fact to a
magistrate, at least in some cases, or perhaps the seriousness of the
crime under investigation would operate as an exigency sufficient
to excuse a pre-investigation warrant but not post-investigation
review.3 The concurrence addressed none of these issues, which
would have been dicta had it done so.
That raises the question of how seriously to take the
concurrence's reasonable expectation analysis. Because Justice
Sotomayor cast her concurring vote with Justice Scalia's majority
opinion, Justice Alito's concurrence did not obtain five votes. At
the same time, Justice Sotomayor clearly expressed agreement
with the concurrence's finding that GPS tracking violates
reasonable expectations of privacy.34 Moreover, Justice
Sotomayor's separate concurrence indicated that she would go
even further and find that GPS tracking surveillance intrudes upon
reasonable expectations of privacy, even when conducted for short
intervals. Justice Sotomayor explained that "[i]n cases involving
even short-term monitoring, some unique attributes of GPS
surveillance relevant to the Katz analysis will require particular
attention."" Nonetheless, Justice Alito's concurrence garnered
only four votes, plus the majority's recognition that a reasonable
expectation of privacy analysis may be used in some future cases,
plus Justice Sotomayor's indication that even shorter term
surveillance may intrude on reasonable expectations. What does
that add up to, and what direction does that provide to lower
courts?
Another pending question is whether lower courts will continue
to use the mosaic theory to decide cases that do not meet the
parameters of the majority's physical trespass approach. The D.C.
3 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2518(7) (2006) (emergency provision under Wiretap
Act permitting wiretap order to issue in emergency situation and order to be
obtained within forty-eight hours).
34 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (agreeing with
Justice Alito that long-term surveillance of most offenses intrudes on
expectations of privacy).
3 Id.
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Circuit would have granted Jones's motion to suppress because the
GPS tracking surveillance allowed the Government to collect
twenty-eight days' worth of information about the totality of
defendants' movements that painted a mosaic of their personal
lives.3 6 While the mosaic theory raises concerns similar to the
prolonged surveillance test that Justice Alito's concurring decision
proposed, the concurrence did not use the same phrasing.
C. Questions Raised by the Sotomayor Concurrence
Finally, there remains the question of what to do with Justice
Sotomayor's separate concurrence. In addition to signing on to the
majority's property-based opinion and indicating support for
finding even short-term GPS-tracking surveillance to violate
reasonable expectations of privacy, Justice Sotomayor reached out
to criticize the third party rule." According to Justice Sotomayor,
"it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily
disclosed to third parties."" In fact, a broad reading of the third
party rule presents the largest stumbling block to claims that
surveillance based on obtaining records of cell site location data
constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment." The
Government has claimed in those cases, with considerable but not
universal success, that a target's use of her cell phone, which
creates records of her location stored by her third-party service
provider, defeats her reasonable expectation of privacy in those
records.4 0 It is crucial to finding a Fourth Amendment privacy
interest in location data records that judges limit the third party
rule to the cases in which it arose-involving dialed telephone
36 See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 563 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff'd sub
nom. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 945.
3 7 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957.
38 Id.
39 See Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data, supra note 22.
40 See id.; see also In Re Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data,
747 F. Supp. 2d 827 (S.D. Tex. 2010), appeal docketed, No. 11-20884 (5th Cir.
Dec. 14, 2011) (oral argument held on Oct. 2, 2012).
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numbers and bank records 4 1-and not extend it to modem cell
phone location data.4 2
Justice Sotomayor is no doubt correct that an expanded third
party rule leads to a contracted view of privacy in location data.43
But, as Justice Sotomayor surely recognized, Jones did not involve
third party records." Government investigators obtained Jones's
location information by monitoring a GPS device that sent
information about Jones's location to their computers in real
time.45 They did not compel the disclosure of records containing
location information from third parties-cell phone service
providers or others. Justice Sotomayor's statement disapproving
of an expanded third party rule was dicta in a one-person
concurrence that garnered no other votes. Neither the majority
decision nor the Alito concurrence mentioned the third party rule.
So will Justice Sotomayor's criticism of the third party rule impact
lower courts?
41 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (finding no reasonable
expectation of privacy invaded when pen register divulged telephone numbers
dialed); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (finding no reasonable
expectation of privacy intruded upon when law enforcement agents compelled a
bank to disclose its customer's bank records).
42 See Brief of Amicus Curiae Susan Freiwald in Support of Affirmance,
supra note 24.
43 See, e.g., Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data, supra note 22, at 733-40;
Stephen E. Henderson, After United States v. Jones, After the Fourth
Amendment Third Party Doctrine, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 431 (2013).
44 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 ("Resolution of these difficult questions in this
case is unnecessary."). According to Christopher Slobogin, one could view
Jones as deciding that "if a trespass occurs, the fact that third parties can observe
the vehicle is irrelevant," and thereby implicating a different third party question
from that involving third party records. See Slobogin, supra note 7; see also id.
at n.30 (describing the "knowing exposure doctrine," the "general public use
doctrine," and the "assumption of risk doctrine" as "three doctrines that
implement the third party idea").
45 See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 565 n.* (2010) (describing
how an installed GPS receiver "permits remote real-time tracking of the target
from police headquarters" (quoting Renee McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up in
Knotts? GPS Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 55 UCLA L. REv. 409,
419 (2007))).
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The Jones opinions left many questions of Fourth Amendment
law unclear. Another important question is how quickly the lower
courts will clear up the confusion.4 6
III. THEDAVIS V. UNITEDSTATESEXCEPTION TO THE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE
As this Article discusses, lower courts' application of the Davis
rule will delay answers to the questions Jones left open as well as
remedies for targets of unconstitutional GPS tracking surveillance.
Broad applications of the Davis rule may well inhibit the
development of Fourth Amendment law and the benefit of Jones
far into the future. Before turning to the lower courts' application
of the Davis rule, this Part describes the Davis case itself.
A. Rights and Retroactivity in Davis
When Willie Gene Davis appealed the denial of his motion to
suppress evidence in light of an intervening Supreme Court
decision that made the search he was subjected to
unconstitutional,4 7 he stood in the same position as many of the
defendants who challenged the evidence obtained by warrantless
GPS tracking surveillance in light of Jones. Law enforcement
agents had obtained incriminating evidence against Davis by
searching the passenger compartment of a car Davis had been
traveling in, after they had secured Davis and the car's driver in a
police car after a routine traffic stop.46 After the search, while
Davis's case was still on appeal, the Supreme Court found
unconstitutional the type of search the officers had conducted. The
46 See Orin Kerr, Lifting the "Fog" of Internet Surveillance: How a
Suppression Remedy Would Change Computer Crime Law, 54 HASTINGS L.J.
805 (2003) (arguing that the Electronic Communications Privacy Act's lack of a
statutory suppression remedy has inhibited the development of case law
interpreting it).
47 Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2422 (2011).
48 Id. at 2425. After the traffic stop, Davis gave a false name and the police
determined that the car's driver was intoxicated. Id. Because Davis was a
previously convicted felon, his possession of an unregistered firearm was a
crime that subjected him to a sentence of 220 months. United States v. Davis,
No. 2:07-cr-0248-WKW, 2008 WL 1927377 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 28, 2008).
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Supreme Court addressed whether the rule it laid down in Arizona
v. Gant,49 which clearly established that officers violated Davis'
Fourth Amendment rights when they searched the car after he was
secured," would entitle Davis to have the evidence obtained from
the search, and also evidence derived from that evidence,
suppressed by operation of the exclusionary rule.'
The retroactivity rule should have provided an answer to the
Supreme Court's question.52 In Griffith v. Kentucky," the Supreme
Court had announced that rules of substantive law may be invoked
until a conviction becomes final on direct review.54 For about
twenty years prior to Griffith, courts had followed the approach set
forth in Linkletter v. Walker," and applied a new substantive rule
of constitutional law retroactively based on a case-by-case
analysis." That often meant that only the defendant in the case
that established the new rule would have his evidence suppressed,
but other defendants whose cases were pending at the time would
not benefit from the new rule." Discomfort with treating like
defendants differently led the Court to abandon the Linkletter
approach in Griffith and find full retroactivity for new
constitutional rules for all pending cases.
49 Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
50 Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2428. Under the rule of Gant, officers could have
searched the car if they had reason to believe that the vehicle contained evidence
relevant to the crime of arrest, but apparently they did not. Id. at 2425.
" Id. at 2419.
52 See id. at 2429-30 ("The principal argument of both the dissent and Davis
is that the exclusionary rule's availability to enforce new Fourth Amendment
precedent is a retroactivity issue.").
5 Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
54 Id. at 328.
5 Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
56 See id. at 629 (describing retroactivity determinations as depending on the
"merits and demerits in each case" and a set of factors that include "the prior
history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective
operation will further or retard operation").
" Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2436 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that, prior to
Griffith, "the Court would often not apply the new rule to identical cases still
pending on appeal").
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Without purporting to overturn Griffith, the Supreme Court
announced in Davis that whether the police had violated Davis's
Fourth Amendment rights was a different question from whether
he was entitled to a suppression remedy by operation of the
exclusionary rule." By reasoning that "[e]xclusion is not a
personal constitutional right, nor is it designed to redress the injury
occasioned by an unconstitutional search,"" the majority
reconciled both, granting that Davis's Fourth Amendment rights
were violated and denying him the suppression remedy.
According to the Court, "[T]he retroactive application of a new
rule of substantive Fourth Amendment law raises the question
whether the suppression remedy applies; it does not answer that
question."o Justice Breyer, writing for himself and Justice
Ginsberg in dissent, called that distinction "highly artificial," and
complained that "[1]eaving Davis with a right but not a remedy ...
'keep[s] the word of promise to our ear' but 'break[s] it to our
hope.' "6" According to the majority's review of the twenty-seven-
year expansion of the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule,
however, the Court had grown habituated to establishing
constitutional rights for which it provided no remedies.6 2
Besides breaking, albeit self-consciously, the link between
suffering a Fourth Amendment injury and obtaining a remedy for
that injury, the majority in Davis dismissed as irrelevant the
concern that "applying the good-faith exception to searches
58 Id. at 2431 (majority opinion) (explaining that "[r]emedy is a separate,
analytically distinct issue" from "[r]etroactive application").
59 Id. at 2426 (internal quotation marks omitted). As discussed below, the
Court announced that the "sole purpose" of the exclusionary rule is "to deter
future Fourth Amendment violations." Id.
60 d at 2431.
61 Id at 2437 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Interestingly, one district court, in later
applying Davis to deny a motion to suppress based on Jones, explained that the
Davis rule made Jones "not retroactive." United States v. Heath, No. CR 12-4-
H-DWM, 2012 WL 1574123, at *1 (D. Mont. May 3, 2012).
62 Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427-28. The majority left unclear at the end of its
decision whether the defendant who initially secures a Supreme Court ruling
overturning a prior decision will be entitled to a suppression remedy. Id. at
2434.
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conducted in reliance on binding precedent will stunt the
development of Fourth Amendment law." 63 Professor Orin Kerr,
who represented Davis in the Supreme Court, expressed his
concerns in a law review article that Fourth Amendment law
cannot develop in a "zone of very limited remedies."6 4 The
dissenting Justices also expressed concern that a broad reading of
the Court's rule would discourage lower courts from "work[ing]
out Fourth Amendment differences among themselves-through
circuit reconsideration of a precedent that other circuits have
criticized." The majority opinion gave short shrift to those
concerns, reiterating that the "sole purpose of the exclusionary rule
is to deter misconduct by law enforcement." 66
The majority in Davis held that "searches conducted in
objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent are
not subject to the exclusionary rule." 67 Applying that holding to
Davis himself, the Court found that, because the law enforcement
officers acted in accordance with then-binding appellate precedent,
they acted in good faith, and therefore the Court affirmed the
denial of Davis's motion to suppress.6 8
The majority's opinion also included much broader language
and expressed considerable discomfort with the exclusionary rule.
For example, the majority complained that "[e]xclusion exacts a
heavy toll on both the judicial system and society at large." 69 it
further described exclusion as a "bitter pill" which "society must
63 Id. at 2432.
64 See Kerr, supra note 18, at 239, 248-61; see, e.g., id. at 240 ("[T]he
exclusionary rule remains the primary means by which Fourth Amendment law
develops."); Reply Brief for the Petitioner, Davis, 131 S. Ct. 2419, (No. 09-
11328), 2011 WL 805255, at *15-21.
65 Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2438 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
66 Id. at 2432 (majority opinion); see also Kerr, supra note 18, at 251 (noting
that the appellate court responded to this concern by explaining that "the
exclusionary rule was about deterrence, not 'foster[ing] the development of
Fourth Amendment law' " (quoting United States v. Davis, 598 F.3d 1259, 1266
n.8 (11th Cir. 2010))).
67Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2423-24.
68 Id. at 2429.
69 Id. at 2427.
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swallow . . . only as a 'last resort.' "70 The majority "reaffirm[ed]
... that the harsh sanction of exclusion 'should not be applied to
deter objectively reasonable law enforcement activity.' "
The question for lower courts would be whether to rely on a
narrow or broad reading of the Davis decision. Limiting Davis to
its facts, one would read it as establishing a good faith exception to
the exclusionary rule only when binding appellate precedent
clearly made constitutional the act later found to be
unconstitutional. That describes the situation in which Davis
found himself. As the next sections describe, however, the Davis
decision has lent itself to both a narrow reading and a much
broader reading based on the language the majority used to
criticize the exclusionary remedy.
B. Narrow and Broad Readings of Davis
Lower courts narrowly applying the Davis rule deny
suppression remedies and usually avoid novel Fourth Amendment
analyses when they find binding and authorizing appellate
precedents. Reviewing courts that apply the Davis rule more
broadly deny suppression remedies based on other equivocal
criteria such as the culpability of the investigating officers or cost-
benefit analyses.
1. Narrow Readings
Several passages in the majority decision support a narrow
reading of the holding. For example, the majority explained that
"[t]he search incident to Davis's arrest in this case followed the
Eleventh Circuit's Gonzalez precedent to the letter. Although the
search turned out to be unconstitutional under Gant, all agree that
the officers' conduct was in strict compliance with then-binding
Circuit law and was not culpable in any way."72 The Court further
elaborated that "when binding appellate precedent specifically
authorizes a particular police practice, well-trained officers will
70 ld.
7' Id. at 2429 (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919 (1984)).
72 Id. at 2428 ("The police acted in strict compliance with binding
precedent.").
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and should use that tool to fulfill their crime-detection and public-
safety responsibilities."73 The question is whether that is the only
time the good faith rule the Court announced applies.
Justice Sotomayor's concurrence largely supports a narrow
reading of the decision. Her opinion pointed out that in Davis'
case "binding appellate precedent specifically authorize[d]" the
police practice at issue, and, in addition, that practice was "in
accord with the holdings of nearly every other court in the
country."74 She clarified that the majority's decision did not apply
to cases in which "the law governing the constitutionality of the
particular search is unsettled.""
Another part of the majority's opinion supports a narrow
reading of the holding. When the majority dismissed the dissent's
and Davis's concern that the good faith rule it was espousing
would prevent review and consideration of lower court's
precedents, the Court clarified that when lower courts uphold a
search or seizure later found to be unconstitutional "in jurisdictions
in which the question remains open [they] will still have an
undiminished incentive to litigate the issue."" That scenario
presumes that lower courts will either not apply the Davis
exception in jurisdictions where there is no binding precedent, or at
least that defendants' lawyers will not be discouraged from
litigating by the fear that Davis will apply in such "open"
jurisdictions."
2. Broad Readings
In dissent, Justice Breyer offered the broadest interpretation of
the majority's holding by pointing out that "to apply the term
" Id. at 2429.
7 4Id. at 2435 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
7 Id. However, Justice Sotomayor went on to reason that in open
jurisdictions, whether to apply the exclusionary rule would depend on operation
of a cost-benefit analysis. Id. at 2436; see infra Part III.B.
76 Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2433.
n7 That there have been so many cases challenging Jones in the year since it
was decided supports this prediction. However, it is unclear whether litigants
will continue to bring claims based on Jones if courts continue to reject them
based on broad interpretations of Davis.
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'binding appellate precedent' often requires resolution of complex
questions of degree."" Justice Breyer asked what would count as
binding precedent and what would happen if the defendant's case
had clearly different facts from a rule of the defendant's circuit or
was covered by a rule from a different circuit. Would police
reliance on those precedents be sufficient to fall under the
majority's rule?7 9 Justice Breyer's dissent elaborated that officers
are not "more culpable where circuit precedent is simply
suggestive rather than 'binding.' "" While Justice Breyer offered
the broad interpretation as reason to dissent from the majority's
opinion because that opinion would lead the good faith exception
to "swallow the exclusionary rule,""' lower courts have ironically
used the dissent's language to justify their broad interpretations of
Davis.8 2
Besides the question of what counts as supportive precedent,
the Davis majority's extended criticism of the exclusionary rule
and its focus solely on the deterrent rationale sent a strong signal to
lower courts that they could look for other ways to expand the
exception the decision laid out. At the outset of the opinion, for
example, Justice Alito introduced the holding by stating: "Because
suppression would do nothing to deter police misconduct in these
circumstances, and because it would come at a high cost both to
the truth and the public safety, we hold that . . . ."8 That
introductory language invites lower courts to find a good faith
exception to the exclusionary remedy not only when officers rely
on binding precedent, but also when the lower court finds no need
to deter police misconduct and when operation of the exclusionary
remedy would come at too high a cost.
" Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2437 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
79 Id. at 2439.
80 Id. See also Kerr, supra note 18, at 255 (discussing the ambiguity of
"binding precedent").
81131 S. Ct. at 2439 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
82 See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 856 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1194 (D. Haw.
2012); United States v. Rose, No. 11-10062-NMG, 2012 WL 4215868, *5 (D.
Mass. Sept. 14, 2012).
83 Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2423.
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The two ideas are related, as the majority in Davis made clear
that it contemplated a cost-benefit analysis. That analysis requires
courts to weigh the cost to granting the suppression remedy to truth
and public safety against its benefit-with the latter limited only to
a consideration of how much excluding evidence will deter
culpable police conduct.84 As the Davis majority explained, "For
exclusion to be appropriate, the deterrence benefits of suppression
must outweigh its heavy costs."" According to the Davis majority,
since the United States v. Leon86 decision recognized a good faith
exception in 1984, the Court has "recalibrated [its] cost-benefit
analysis in exclusion cases to focus the inquiry on the 'flagrancy of
the police misconduct' at issue.""
In other words, the Davis majority encouraged lower courts to
focus on the culpability of the individual officers, potentially
independently of their reliance on binding precedent." The
majority summarized the "basic insight of the [good faith] line of
cases" as "the deterrence benefits of exclusion 'var[y] with the
culpability of the law enforcement conduct' at issue."89 It
elaborated that "[w]hen the police exhibit deliberate, reckless, or
grossly negligent disregard for Fourth Amendment rights, the
deterrent value of exclusion is strong and tends to outweigh the
resulting costs," but "when the police act with an objectively
reasonable good faith belief that their conduct is lawful . .. or
when their conduct involves only simple, isolated negligence ...
8
4 Id. at 2422-23.
8 Id. at 2427.
86 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
8 7Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427.
8 See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 140, 143 (2009) (discussing
police culpability); Kerr, supra note 18, at 254 ("Davis builds on the Court's ...
decision in Herring v. United States, which introduced the focus on culpability
as a key to the application of the exclusionary rule.");
89Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427 (quoting Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135,
143 (2009)); see also Craig M. Bradley, Is the Exclusionary Rule Dead?, 102 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 10-12, 23 (2012) (discussing the ambiguity of how
to determine police culpability in the wake of Herring and Davis).
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the deterrence rationale loses much of its force, and exclusion
cannot pay its way.""
The dissenting Justices again used the majority's broad
approach as a reason to disagree with its holding. Justice Breyer
expressed the concern that by repeating and expanding upon the
broad dicta in the Herring decision, the majority was "leading
lower courts in th[e] direction" of "plac[ing] determinative weight
upon the culpability of [the] individual officer's conduct, and . . .
apply[ing] the exclusionary rule only where a Fourth Amendment
violation was 'deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent.' ""
IV. COURTS USE DA VIS TO AVOID ANSWERING QUESTIONS
RAISED BY JONES
As this Part describes, some courts have taken up the invitation
that dissenting Justices feared the Davis majority was issuing.
They have relied on a broad version of the Davis rule to deny a
suppression remedy to defendants who were victims of searches
that are clearly unconstitutional under Jones. Additionally, lower
courts have used the Davis rule, both in narrow and broad form, to
avoid engaging in a meaningful analysis of the questions raised by
Jones.
A. Courts Find Davis Applies Because of Binding Appellate
Precedent
The Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Pineda-
Moreno92 offers an excellent example of how lower courts use
even a narrow version of the Davis rule to avoid addressing the
issues raised in Jones. Law enforcement agents had conducted
90 Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427-28 (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted).
9' Id. at 2439 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see David A. Moran, Hanging On By a
Thread, The Exclusionary Rule (or What's Left of It) Lives for Another Day, 9
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 393 (2011-2012) (arguing that the broad reading of Davis
is dicta building on dicta, but that it indicates the Supreme Court's efforts to
eviscerate the exclusionary rule).
92 United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 688 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2012), cert.
denied, 133 S. Ct. 994 (2013).
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GPS tracking surveillance of Pineda-Moreno's Jeep in 2007.93 His
case was on appeal to the Supreme Court when the Court issued
Jones. The Supreme Court remanded Pineda-Moreno's case back
to the Ninth Circuit to reconsider his motion to suppress in light of
its decision in Jones.9 4 Instead of analyzing the impact of Jones on
the GPS tracking surveillance at issue, the Ninth Circuit, on
remand, "assume[d], without deciding, that th[e] warrantless
searches [conducted by police of Pineda-Moreno] would be
'unreasonable' under the Fourth Amendment after Jones.""
Nonetheless, the court determined that officers, in installing GPS
tracking devices on Pineda-Moreno's Jeep and monitoring it for a
three-month period without a warrant, "did so in objectively
reasonable reliance on then-binding precedent" in the Ninth
Circuit.96 Having determined that, the court explained that it could
wait to "address the effect of Jones more fully in future cases.""
Because the narrow version of the Davis rule has the lower
courts look to what circuit precedent held at the time of the search
at issue, the Ninth Circuit analyzed the applicability of precedent
cases from 1999, 1978, and 1976." The Ninth Circuit completely
ignored the reasoning of the 2010 decision in which it had first
considered Pineda-Moreno's motion before the Jones case was
decided but after the search of Pineda-Moreno was conducted in
2007. 9 That earlier decision had nothing to say about the circuit
precedent that was binding in 2007, at the time of the search.'oo
But those 2010 opinions, although ultimately denying Pineda-
Moreno's motion to suppress, contained a wealth of analysis about
how to update the electronic monitoring precedents to current
conditions. They included a scathing dissent from rehearing en
9' Id. at 1089.
94 Pineda-Moreno v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1533 (2012).
95 Pineda-Moreno, 688 F.3d at 1090.
96 Id
97 Id. at 1090-91.
98 Id. at 1090; see also United States v. McIver, 186 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir.
1999); United States v. Miroyan, 577 F.2d 489 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Hufford, 539 F.2d 32 (9th Cir. 1976).
9 See United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010).00 See generally id.
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banc issued by Chief Judge Kozinski, in which he called his
colleagues to task for approving of warrantless GPS tracking that
would usher in an Orwellian future.'o' Judge Kozinski's argument
would surely have stood on a stronger footing had the other judges
reconsidered it in light of the Supreme Court's Jones opinions.
But the Davis holding led them to put that off for another day.
A Ninth Circuit decision that engaged the Jones reasoning
directly could have included significant sophisticated analysis
about how to apply Jones. The Ninth Circuit has traditionally been
at the forefront of Fourth Amendment law development. As a
result of its decision in Theofel v. Farey-Jones,02 for example, law
enforcement investigators seeking e-mail from electronic storage
must obtain a warrant. In other circuits, judges will permit access
to open and accessed emails, and emails stored one hundred and
eighty days and longer, when law enforcement agents obtain an
easier-to-obtain court order under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d)."' The
Ninth Circuit, again led by Judge Kozinski, has also broken new
ground on questions of how to regulate computer searches.' 04
Application of the Davis rule, even in a narrow form, has delayed
meaningful Ninth Circuit input at least until it considers searches
conducted after the Jones decision issued.
The Seventh Circuit also has binding appellate precedent that
would make warrantless GPS tracking surveillance prior to Jones
'o' United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1121-26 (9th Cir. 2010)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("Some day, soon, we may wake up and find we're
living in Oceania.").
102 Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2004).
03 See Susan Freiwald, Online Surveillance: Remembering the Lessons of the
Wiretap Act, 56 ALA. L. REv. 9, 58 (2004); Paul Ohm, Probably Probable
Cause: The Diminishing Importance of Justification Standards, 94 MINN. L.
REV. 1514, 1538-42 (2010) (describing how the Ninth Circuit interprets an
ECPA provision pertaining to e-mail surveillance differently from the
Department of Justice).
104 See United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, 621 F.3d 1162, 1178-
80 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, J., concurring) (providing "guidance about how to
deal with searches of electronically stored data in the future so that the public,
the government and the courts of our circuit can be confident such searches and
seizures are conducted lawfully").
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objectively reasonable.'o5  United States v. Garcia,'6 decided in
2007, established that GPS tracking surveillance is not a search
under the Fourth Amendment and requires no warrant based on
probable cause.'0 7  As it did with Pineda-Moreno, the Supreme
Court remanded a Seventh Circuit case, United States v. Cuevas-
Perez,'s for reconsideration in light of Jones.o' The Seventh
Circuit ended up approving a plea agreement in which Cuevas-
Perez was released for time served."0 Had the Seventh Circuit
instead issued a decision, it likely would have looked backward to
Garcia and ignored both the Jones opinion and the interesting
analyses from the original panel decision issued in 2011. In the
2011 decision, the majority had rejected Cuevas-Perez's motion to
suppress because the evidence was gathered during a single trip,
but it had offered some support for the mosaic approach when
tracking lasts longer than the sixty hours at issue in the case."'
The dissenting judge would have granted the suppression remedy
for an unlawful search because at the time the agents began
monitoring the GPS device, they had been doing so for an
"indefinite period of time."" 2 Judge Flaum concurred in the denial
of the motion to suppress on the grounds that Supreme Court
precedent foreclosed the question and he also rejected the
1os See United States v. Shelburne, No. 3:11-cr-156-S, 2012 WL 2344457, at
*3 (W.D. Ky. June 20, 2012) (applying Seventh Circuit law to search conducted
in Indiana and finding that binding appellate precedent in the Seventh Circuit
made warrantless GPS tracking surveillance lawful in the Seventh Circuit prior
to Jones).
106 United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d. 994 (7th Cir. 2007).
107 Id. at 997-98 ("GPS tracking is on the same side of the divide with the
surveillance cameras and the satellite imaging, and if what they do is not
searching in Fourth Amendment terms, neither is GPS tracking.").
108 United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272 (7th Cir. 2011).
109 Cuevas-Perez v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1534 (2012).
'n0 United States v. Cuevas-Perez, No. 13-40021-GPM (S.D. Ill. Jan. 23,
2013.) (Judgment in a Criminal Case).
.Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d at 274-75.
112 Id. at 294-95 (Wood, J., dissenting) ("To conclude that open-ended, real-
time GPS surveillance is not a 'search' invites an unprecedented level of
government intrusion into every person's private life.").
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reasoning of the mosaic approach." 3  Judge Flaum went on to
suggest that were the court in fact "empowered to examine the
questions surrounding GPS monitoring," one could view long-term
GPS tracking as akin to a general warrant; besides being the chief
evil the Fourth Amendment was designed to combat, general
warrants can "be used arbitrarily or ... may alter the relationship
between citizen and government in a way that is inimical to
democratic society."' "4
Just as in the Ninth Circuit, a full consideration of the Jones
opinions in the Seventh Circuit could well have inspired the
creativity of judges, like the concurring judge in Cuevas-Perez, to
improve upon the prolonged surveillance test of Justice Alito's
concurrence in Jones. And although the plea agreement obviated
the question in Cuevas-Perez, the likely narrow application of the
Davis reasoning by the Seventh Circuit would have precluded such
analysis. "'
As soon as defendants begin to challenge GPS tracking
surveillance taking place after the Jones decision issued, courts
will not be able to find reasonable reliance on binding appellate
precedent to avoid application of the exclusionary rule and analysis
of Jones. But a broad application of Jones, which the next parts
discuss, may persist in putting off consideration of the issues
unanswered by Jones even beyond that point.
B. Courts Find Davis Applies in the Absence of Binding Appellate
Precedent
Despite Justice Sotomayor's concurring opinion that the
exception to the exclusionary rule set forth in Davis applies only
when binding appellate precedent specifically authorized the police
" Id. at 276-85 (Flaum, J., concurring).
''
4 Id. at 285.
"s A court in the Sixth Circuit took just that approach when it applied Seventh
Circuit law to address the GPS location tracking at issue because officers had
begun their investigation in the Seventh Circuit. See United States v. Shelburne,
No. 3:1 1-cr-156-S, 2012 WL 2344457, at *3 (W.D. Ky. June 20, 2012).
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practice at issue," 6 courts have extended Davis to apply when
precedent from outside the governing jurisdiction supports the
practice as well."' In United States v. Leon,"' for example, the
district court of Hawaii determined that, while binding Ninth
Circuit precedent "specifically authorized" the installation of the
GPS device on the defendant's vehicle, "neither Supreme Court
nor Ninth Circuit binding precedent in 2009 authorized the agents
to continuously monitor the location of the vehicle in public places
for a prolonged period of time."" 9 Because the "sole circuit court
to consider the use of a GPS device prior to 2009 [the Seventh
Circuit in Garcia] found no Fourth Amendment violation,"
however, the district court of Hawaii denied the defendant's
motion to suppress evidence.'2 0
Rather than evaluate whether the defendant had made any new
Fourth Amendment arguments that merited reconsideration in light
of Jones, the Leon court, like the Pineda-Moreno court, looked
backward to the state of the law in 2009 to determine whether to
deny the motion to suppress by virtue of the Davis exception. 2 '
Government litigators even conceded that the GPS tracking
11 Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, at 2435 (2011) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring).
1" See, e.g., United States v. Ford, No. 1:11-CR-42, 2012 WL 5366049, at
*11 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 30, 2012) (denying suppression because officer's "reliance
on three out of four federal circuits to hear the GPS tracking device issue was
reasonable . . . [and] insufficiently culpable"); United States v. Baez, 878 F.
Supp. 2d 288, 294 (D. Mass. 2012).
118 See United States v. Leon, 856 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1192 (D. Haw. 2012).
"' Id. at 1193. The Ninth Circuit did not consider the prolonged surveillance
issue in Pineda-Moreno, presumably because the agents monitored over the
course of seven discreet installations. United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 688 F.3d
1087, 1089 (9th Cir. 2012); see infra Part IV.A. Oddly, however, the Leon court
cited the 2010 Pineda-Moreno decision as supporting its finding that it was
reasonable for officers in 2007 to believe that warrantless use of a GPS tracking
surveillance for a prolonged period was lawful. Leon, 856 F. Supp. 2d at 1194
(citing United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010)).
120 Leon, 856 F. Supp. 2d at 1194-95.
121 Id.
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surveillance they had engaged in was unconstitutional under
Jones.122
Not surprisingly, in looking to the law of other circuits to
determine whether to apply the Davis exception to the
exclusionary rule, the Leon court clearly relied on a broad reading
of Davis. The court emphasized that the sole purpose of the
exclusion of evidence is to deter, invoking the cost-benefit analysis
whereby "the deterrence benefit of suppression must outweigh its
heavy costs," and noting that "[d]eterrence benefits vary 'with the
culpability of the law enforcement conduct.' "123 While the Leon
court indicated that Davis was not "directly controlling"l24 because
of the lack of binding appellate precedent, it also indicated that the
focus of the "Davis standard" is the "culpability of the law
enforcement conduct."125  The question, therefore, was whether
officers "exhibited 'deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent
disregard for Fourth Amendment rights' or whether they acted
'with an objectively reasonable good-faith belief that their conduct
[was] lawful.' "126
With such open-ended direction, it should not be surprising that
some lower courts, in applying the Davis exception, have looked
farther afield than precedents from other circuits to excuse
officers' conduct. Some courts have explained that they were
relying on unsettled law rather than binding precedent from other
circuits, and therefore focusing on culpability and the cost-benefit
analysis that Davis directed them to conduct.'27  Others have
indicated that because officers consulted with senior law
122 Id. at 1191 ("The United States now concedes that Jones renders the
placement and subsequent use of the GPS device unconstitutional.").
123 Id. (quoting Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2427 (2011)).
12 4 Id. at 1193.
125 Id. at 1192.
126 Id. at 1193 (quoting Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427).
127 See, e.g., United States v. Guyton, No. 11-271, 2013 WL 55837, at *3
(E.D. La. Jan. 3, 2013) (explaining that a "case-by-case approach is more
appropriate and therefore focuses on the 'flagrancy of the police misconduct' at
issue" (quoting Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2426)); United States v. Rose, No. 11-
10062-NMG, 2012 WL 4215868, at *5 (D. Mass. Sept. 14, 2012) (describing
the need to "engag[e] in a rigorous, cost-benefit analysis").
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enforcement officers, their conduct was not sufficiently culpable to
justify application of the exclusionary remedy.'2 8
C. Courts Expand the Davis Exception Beyond All Reason
The Supreme Court granted Jones's motion to suppress the
evidence obtained by the warrantless installation and monitoring of
a GPS tracking device installed on his wife's car, but did not
address the cell site location data that law enforcement officers had
compelled Jones's cell site provider to disclose. Aided by amici
Center for Democracy and Technology and the Electronic Frontier
Foundation,'29 Jones and his lawyers brought a motion to suppress
the cell site location information.'3 0 Although Jones argued that
the Supreme Court's decision had significant implications for his
location privacy claim, the district court refused to even consider
those arguments, declining to "resolve this vexing question of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, since it conclude[d] that the
good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applie[d]."'
Jones claimed that law enforcement agents violated the Stored
Communications Act'32 in two ways: (1) acquiring prospective cell
site location data using only a court order under 18 U.S.C.§ 2703(d) ("D order") and (2) not satisfying the statutory
requirement of "specific and articulable facts showing there are
reasonable grounds to believe that ... the records or other
128 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, No. 10-cr-67 (GMS), 2012 WL 3930317,
at *10 (D. Del. Sept. 10, 2012) (finding good faith when investigating officer
based his decision not to obtain a warrant on prior experience and consultation
with senior police officers and advice from the State Attorney General's office).
129 See Brief of Amici Curiae of the Electronic Frontier Foundation and
Center for Democracy and Technology in Support of Antoine Jones' Motion to
Suppress Cell Site Data, Jones, No. 05-CR-386(1) (ESH), 2012 WL 5994549
(D.D.C. Aug. 13, 2012). The author has worked as amicus curiae alongside
these two groups, as well as the ACLU, in recent cases challenging warrantless
government access to historical cell site location data. See Freiwald, Cell Phone
Location Data, supra note 22 (describing 3rd Circuit case); Brief of Amicus
Curiae Susan Freiwald in Support of Affirmance, supra note 24.
130 Jones, No. 05-0386 (ESH), 2012 WL 6443136, at *1 (D.D.C. Dec. 14,
2012).
132 id.
132 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2006).
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information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing
criminal investigation."' As to the first question, the district court
recognized that other courts either have required a more
demanding warrant based on probable cause for access to
prospective cell site location data (information gathered after the
order is granted) or have permitted acquisition of such data only
when agents have obtained both a less demanding D order and a
pen register order (a so-called "hybrid order").'34 Some courts
have permitted D orders to be used to acquire historical cell site
data (information already contained in stored records when the
order is issued).' Whether or not it is constitutionally
permissible, the argument that historical cell site data may be
obtained with a D order is a reasonable construction of the
statutory language that permits D orders to be used to obtain "a
record or other information.""' But courts have not permitted law
enforcement agents to obtain prospective cell site location
information, which would not, by definition, be stored in a record,
solely through use of a D order.'"
'" Jones, 2012 WL 6443136, at *3 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d)).
134 Id. See generally Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data, supra note 22;
Stephanie Pell & Christopher Soghoian, Can You See Me Now?: Towards
Reasonable Standards fbr Law Enforcement Access to Location Data that
Congress Could Enact, 27 BERK. TECH. L. J. 117 (2012).
13 See Jones, 2012 WL 6443136, at *5 & n.9 (collecting cases). Other courts
have required a warrant for access to historical cell site location data. See id. at
n.9; see also Brief of Amicus Curiae Susan Freiwald in Support of Affirmance,
supra note 24 (describing the author's involvement as amicus in a case pending
in the 5th Circuit in which she argues that access to historical cell site location
data requires a warrant based on probable cause).
136 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c) (Supp. V 2011); see also Freiwald, Cell Phone
Location Data, supra note 22 (making argument that historical cell site location
data is protected by the Fourth Amendment and that the Stored Communications
Act is unconstitutional to the extent it allows access to such data with just a D
order).
1 See Steven B. Toeniskoetter, Preventing a Modern Panopticon: Law
Enforcement Acquisition of Real-Time Cellular Tracking Data, 13 RICH. J.L. &
TECH. 17 (2007) (describing how agents apply for hybrid orders to obtain
prospective cell site location data). But see Susan Freiwald, The Vanishing
Distinction Between Real-time and Historical Location Data, CONCURRING
OPINIONs, (July 17, 2012, 4:50 PM), http://www.concurringopinions.com/
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The district court opinion first described, then dismissed
without analysis, Jones's statutory claims. Because the Stored
Communications Act lacks a statutory suppression remedy, the
court opined that it "need not weigh in on th[e] debate" over what
type of court order is necessary to obtain prospective cell site
data.'38 As for the second claim, "Even assuming the applications
lacked sufficient factual support, the Court would be powerless to
order the suppression of the evidence that the government had
obtained," so the court saw no need to opine."'
The court went on to take the same hands-off approach to the
Fourth Amendment questions that Jones raised. Without taking
any position, the court laid out Jones's arguments and the
Government's responses and conducted a survey of prior case
law.'40 After recognizing "a robust debate over the question of
whether the Fourth Amendment applies to cell-site data obtained
from a cellular provider," and after speculating that the "issue may
someday receive the attention of the Supreme Court," the district
court opined that it "need not decide" the constitutional question
because of the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.'4 '
In applying the good faith exception, the district court did not
explicitly find that officers relied on binding appellate precedent,
but rather found they reasonably relied on a defective warrant and
an invalid statute.'4 2 The court's application of those two good
faith exceptions was so loose and forgiving of the officer's
archives/2012/07/the-vanishing-distinction-between-real-time-and-historical-loc
ation-data.html (describing how, in a case on appeal to the Fifth Circuit, agents
asked for cell site location records to be created in real-time and then stored, and
then immediately transmitted to law enforcement agents as soon as they were
stored).
' Jones, 2012 WL 6443136, at *4.
19 Id.
1401 d. at *4-6.
141 Id. at *7.
142 Id. at n.16. The court disclaimed reliance on the binding precedent rule
because it did not want to resolve whether Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735
(1979), was "sufficiently on point to be binding." Id.; see Freiwald, Cell Phone
Location Data, supra note 22, at 732-43 (arguing that Smith v. Maryland does
not apply to historical cell site records).
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conduct, however, that a broad reading of the Davis decision surely
motivated the court's approach. In fact, at the beginning of the
court's good faith discussion, it quoted the following expansive
language from the Davis majority: "[E]xclusion is not required
'when the police act with an objectively reasonable good-faith
belief that their conduct is lawful.' "143
In applying the exception under which searches conducted in
reasonable reliance on statutes that are subsequently invalidated do
not justify application of the exclusionary rule,'4 4 the court engaged
in a largely unfocused analysis that did not address the key
question: How were the officers interpreting the statute? By
relying on 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c), officers were seeking to have
Jones's cell phone service provider create information in the future
(in the four months after the orders were issued) and send that (cell
site location) information to them under a statutory provision
designed to obtain access to stored "records."' 45 How can that
obviously wrong reading of a statute be considered reasonable
reliance? The court cited to cases permitting access to prospective
cell site location information under a hybrid order, 46 to support the
claim that officers could rely solely on a D order. 147 But decisions
upholding use of the hybrid order did so because hybrid orders rely
on two types of orders, not one.1" Ultimately, the court excused
the officers' conduct because the officers could not "be charged
143 Jones, 2012 WL 6443136, at *7 (quoting Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct.
2419, 2427 (2011)).
144 Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1987) ("[L]egislators, like judicial
officers, are not the focus of the rule.").
145 See Freiwald, supra note 137.
146 See supra notes 134, 137, and accompanying text.
147 See Jones, 2012 WL 6443136, at *8. The court referred back to a footnote
that listed decisions in which other courts had required a warrant for prospective
cell site location data (note 5) but probably meant to refer back to the footnote
that listed decisions in which courts had permitted access to prospective cell site
location data upon presentation of a hybrid order (note 6). The court had cited
no decisions that had permitted access to prospective cell site location data
merely upon presentation of a D order.
148 See generally Toeniskoetter, supra note 137 (describing history of courts'
acceptance and rejection of the hybrid theory).
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with knowledge that § 2703(c) does not apply to prospective cell-
site data" despite its plain language focus on records and its
location in a statute dedicated to Stored Communications.149 Only
a court persuaded to give officers the benefit of every doubt could
come to such a conclusion.
The Court engaged in similarly strained logic when it
purported to apply the good faith doctrine from Leon, where the
Supreme Court announced that the exclusionary rule does not
apply when police conduct a search in "objectively reasonable
reliance" on a warrant later held to be invalid.'" The officers in
Jones did not rely on a warrant because there was no warrant,
defective or otherwise.' Instead, officers and agents likely
convinced the magistrate judges on duty that a D order was enough
to justify use of the new technology. One of the magistrate judges
who issued an order subsequently changed his mind and began
denying similar requests, likely after learning more about the
technology in question.'52 Even after amici brought that to the
court's attention and explained that the magistrate judges likely
"rubber stamp[ed]" agents' requests for court orders without giving
it much thought, the court nonetheless found the officers were
entitled to rely "on the independent judicial determinations that no
warrant was required."' 53
The court concluded that the officers' conduct was objectively
reasonable because the "unsettled nature of the law" at the time of
the search made it "reasonable for them to believe that the Fourth
Amendment was not implicated."5 4 Although the court had
purported to apply the good faith exceptions based on reasonable
149 Jones, 2012 WL 6443136, at *8.
1so United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984).
5 Jones, 2012 WL 6443136, at *1, *8; Defendant's Motion to Suppress Cell
Site Data, No. 05-CR-386(1) (ESH), 2012 WL 1576673 (D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2012).
152 See Kevin S. Bankston, Only the DOJ Knows: The Secret Law of
Electronic Surveillance, 41 U.S.F. L. REv. 589, 613-14 (2007) (discussing the
"magisterial revolution," when magistrate judges began questioning and then
resisting law enforcement efforts to acquire cell site location data and similar
information without adequate judicial oversight).
" Jones, 2012 WL 6443136, at *9.
154 id.
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reliance on a statute and on a warrant, those exceptions provided
such weak justification for a good faith finding that something else
must have been going on. That something else seems to be that the
court took up the invitation that Justice Breyer worried about in his
dissent in Davis.'" It followed the broad language of Davis to
withhold the exclusionary rule from all but the most egregious
cases.'5 6 By doing so, the court deprived a defendant, ironically
Jones himself, of the benefits of the Jones case and the rest of us of
a developing Fourth Amendment law. '
A recent case in the Southern District of Texas provides further
evidence that courts will use Davis to avoid developing Fourth
Amendment law on location data privacy. In United States v.
Muniz,'" the court denied the defendant's motion to suppress,
which she brought on the ground that officers obtained her
historical cell site location data without a warrant. 15 The court
used reasoning similar to that in the Jones case on remand and
relied on a broad view of Davis. To avoid the good faith exception
to the exclusionary rule, the court required the defendant to
establish that the investigating officers "exhibit[ed] deliberate,
reckless, or grossly negligent disregard for Fourth Amendment
rights."'o In addition, the court explained at length that it was not
necessary to "[d]etermin[e] the proper standard" for access to
historical location data; because "[t]he good-faith exception to the
exclusionary rule applies, . . . it [is] unnecessary to decide whether
1ss See supra text accompanying note 91.
156 See Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2440 (2011) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (expressing concern that majority's approach will lead to "a watered-
down Fourth Amendment, offering its protection against only those searches and
seizures that are egregiously unreasonable").
"s See Jones, 2012 WL 6443136, at *7; see also United States v. Hardrick,
No. 10-202, 2012 WL 4883666, at *5 (E.D. La. 2012) (using similar good faith
reasoning and a broad approach to Davis to excuse law enforcement's
acquisition of cell site location data without a warrant).
158 United States v. Muniz, No. H-12-221, 2013 WL 391161 (S.D. Tex. Jan.
29, 2013).
59 Id. at *1, *4.
o60 Id. at *2 (quoting Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2426-27).
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obtaining [cell site location information] is a Fourth Amendment
search." 6'
V. VERY FEW COURTS ANSWER JONES'S QUESTIONS DESPITE
DA VIS
Some post-Jones decisions have begun to engage in Fourth
Amendment analysis, but when they ultimately deny a suppression
remedy based on Davis, their analysis is often tentative and dicta.
Only when courts refuse to apply Davis do they offer a view of
what the post-Jones world would look like without the Davis rule.
It is a world in which courts work out the questions that Jones left
open and develop a meaningful law of location data privacy. 162
A. Courts Address Substantive Questions Before Denying a
Suppression Remedy Based on Davis
Just because a court will go on to deny a motion to suppress
does not mean that it has to refuse to engage in an analysis of the
substantive questions raised by Jones first.' However, as one
court explained when it declined to address the quantum of
161 Id The court went on to note that courts should nonetheless reach Fourth
Amendment issues for novel questions of law when necessary to guide law
enforcement and magistrates in the future, but determined that was unnecessary
here because of the pending Fifth Circuit case. Id.
162 For the author's writings about the emerging law of location data privacy,
see Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data, supra note 22 (describing how the
Fourth Amendment should apply to even historical cell site location data); Susan
Freiwald, The Four Factor Test (unpublished manuscript 2012), available at
http://works.bepress.com/susan freiwald/11 (describing how to apply previously
developed four factor test to GPS surveillance).
163 The author thanks David Gray for bringing to my attention that courts can
engage in substantive discussion of Fourth Amendment rights before deciding to
deny an exclusionary remedy, and that there was a period when the Supreme
Court directed lower courts to do just that. The Supreme Court's decision in
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009), overruled its prior requirement, set
out in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), that courts determine first whether
officers violated petitioners' constitutional rights before determining whether
sovereign immunity nonetheless excuses the officers' conduct. See Kerr, supra
note 18, at 243, 258-59 (discussing the two cases and their impact on Fourth
Amendment law development).
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suspicion required for GPS tracking surveillance, "[j]udicial
restraint compels federal courts to abstain from addressing
constitutional issues unless adjudication is unavoidable."" The
court went on to explain that "district courts routinely decline to
address the open questions in Jones when the good faith exception
to the exclusionary rule is applicable.""' Those courts that do
address substantive issues despite applying the Davis exception
tend to either limit themselves to questions of standing or engage
in reasoning that would have to be considered dicta.
For example, in United States v. Lopez, 6 6 the district court of
Delaware found that Lopez had standing to bring his motion to
suppress GPS tracking surveillance evidence because he had
"possession of the vehicles sufficient to satisfy the trespass
standing requirements the majority outlined in Jones." 67 The court
went on to reach "the same conclusion applying the Katz's
reasonable expectation of privacy test supported by the Jones's
concurrence."M The court engaged in significant discussion of
whether the GPS tracking was sufficiently prolonged, having taken
place not over four months but on only seventeen days during that
extended period, and whether the warrant requirement applied or
instead whether the Government was correct that a "totality of the
circumstances" approach based on "reasonable suspicion" was
enough.' 6' But for those questions as well as others, the court
repeatedly declined to offer a definitive analysis in light of its
finding that the officers acted in good faith based on Davis.'70
Some courts, though they ultimately find that the Davis
exception to the exclusionary remedy applies, either based on a
164 United States v. Guyton, No. 11-271, 2013 WL 55837, at *3 n.7 (E.D. La.
Jan. 3, 2013) (citing Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 854 (1985)).
16 5 id.
166 United States v. Lopez, C.A. No. 10-cr-67 (GMS), 2012 WL 3930317 (D.
Del. Sept. 10, 2012).
167 Id. at *6.
68 Id. at *7.
169 See id. at *8 n.20.
170 See id. at *8-9 (using a cost-benefit approach to the Davis holding rather
than finding binding circuit precedent).
SPING 2013]1 375
N.C. J.L. & TECH.
broad or narrow reading of Davis, nevertheless engage in an
analysis of one or more of the Jones's substantive questions. For
example, in United States v. Ford, 7 the District Court for the
Eastern District of Tennessee first rejected the Government's
argument that no warrant was required for GPS surveillance, even
after Jones.'7 2 The Government had proposed a "totality of the
circumstances" approach to justifying GPS surveillance, and
argued that such an approach did not require the pre-approval of a
warrant.'17 The court found that the automobile exception did not
apply to GPS tracking surveillance and that "the traditional warrant
requirement" did apply.174  The court analyzed whether the
"totality of the circumstances" factors were met, however, and did
not clarify whether traditional probable cause would need to be
met in future cases.' Because the court ultimately denied the
motion to suppress, on a broad reading of Davis,'76 any analysis of
the proper standard would most likely be considered dicta and so
unhelpful to the development of Fourth Amendment law.
B. Courts Find Davis Not to Apply to the Investigation at Issue
The few cases that have applied Davis in a narrow manner
found it not to apply and gone on to evaluate the merits of the
defendants' motions to suppress in light of the Jones decision, give
some indication of what the post-Jones world would look like
without the shadow cast by Davis. Those opinions first typically
engage in a detailed analysis of why the Davis exception to the
exclusionary rule should not be extended beyond its facts; in other
words, it should not be used to deny a suppression remedy unless
binding appellate precedent in the defendant's own jurisdiction
'1' United States v. Ford, No. 1:11-CR-42, 2012 WL 5366049 (E.D. Tenn.
Oct. 30, 2012).
12I.at *8.172 d
an Id
174id
SId
176 See id at *9-11 (applying the Davis exception despite the lack of binding
appellate precedent).
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specifically authorized the conduct at issue."' Then, in reasoning
that is essential to the holdings, the opinions engage the questions
left open by Jones.
For example, in United States v. Ortiz, a district court in the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania engaged in a careful analysis of
the Government's argument that reasonable suspicion was
sufficient to justify GPS tracking surveillance before rejecting it
and requiring a warrant based on probable cause.'7 ' The Ortiz
court carefully assessed the "special needs" precedents and decided
that they did not apply to GPS tracking surveillance, which falls
squarely in the category of "routine law enforcement investigative
activity in a criminal context."'" The court also rejected the
applicability of the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement, finding that the cases based on that exception relied
on an exigency rationale that did not apply in the context of the
GPS tracking surveillance at issue where officers had time to apply
to the magistrate for a warrant.'"' In the course of its analysis, the
court recognized that the Justices in Jones had acknowledged that
the intrusiveness and technological sophistication of GPS tracking
surveillance makes it meaningfully different from the primitive
radio beepers that the Supreme Court considered in the 1980s.'8 2
The court also explained that Jones rendered prior precedents that
" See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, No. S2-4:11CR00361AGF (DDN),
2012 WL 4893643, *13-15 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 15, 2012); United States v. Ortiz,
878 F. Supp. 2d 515, 539-43 (E.D. Pa 2012); United States v. Katzin, No. I1-
226, 2012 WL 1646894, *7-10 (E.D. Pa. May 9, 2012) (rejecting good faith
exception after engaging in analysis of substantive questions).
78 United States v. Ortiz, 878 F. Supp. 2d 515 (E.D. Pa. 2012).
'9 Id. at 526-34.
sOId. at 533.
"' Id. at 534-37.
182 See id. at 531 ("Because technology has evolved in the intervening years,
GPS trackers work differently from the beepers the Supreme Court considered
in Knotts and Karo, and GPS trackers have the potential to be significantly more
intrusive."); see also Robinson, 2012 WL 4893643, at *15 (coming to a similar
conclusion because the beeper cases involved different technology and a
different degree of intrusion).
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had permitted reasonable suspicion for GPS tracking surveillance
inapplicable. 13
Not all courts that reject the Government's argument that Davis
should apply in the absence of binding authority based on the
"controlling law of the land"l8 4 end up granting motions to
suppress. In United States v. Robinson,'" a district court in
Missouri directly addressed the question of whether reasonable
suspicion or probable cause was necessary to justify GPS tracking
surveillance, having found the Davis exception not to apply. 86
The court engaged in the same analysis as had the Ortiz court, and
concluded that because the GPS tracking surveillance at issue was
non-invasive and occurred in public, for a reasonable period of
time, reasonable suspicion was sufficient to justify its use.'87 As a
result, the Robinson court denied the defendant's motion to
suppress, recognizing that "[i]t may well be that in a future opinion
the Eighth Circuit will modify its approach to the issue in light of
Jones."'" That may well be, so long as courts continue to engage
in the issues rather than avoid them based on Davis.
VI. CONCLUSION
After the Jones decision came down, expectations ran high that
the lower courts would soon provide answers to the questions the
opinions left unanswered about the scope and application of the
Fourth Amendment right Jones announced. Even narrow
applications of the Davis exception to the exclusionary rule will
likely delay those answers until searches take place governed only
by Jones and not by binding appellate precedent that preceded
83 Ortiz, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 529-30 (explaining that Jones dramatically
reduced the "persuasive value" of United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604 (8th
Cir. 2010) and United States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1981)).
184 See, e.g., Robinson, 2012 WL 4893643, at *13.
United States v. Robinson, No. S2-4:11CROO361AGF (DDN), 2012 WL
4893643 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 15, 2012).
116 See id. at *15.
"' Id. at *16. Unlike Ortiz, the Robinson court found that Jones did not
abrogate Marquez. Id.
"'Id. at *17.
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Jones. However, broad application of the Davis rule, according to
which courts engage in a cost-benefit analysis of the deterrence
value of exclusion and focus on officer culpability, could lead
courts to deny suppression remedies in cases involving GPS
tracking and related surveillance even after Jones makes it
unreasonable for officers to rely on binding appellate precedent. A
broad interpretation of Davis untethers officers' conduct from
appellate precedent and may lead courts to excuse that conduct and
refuse to engage Jones's questions whenever judges consider the
officers' conduct not to be egregious. In that case, not only will
the questions left open in Jones stay open indefinitely, but courts
themselves will be egregiously underenforcing the constitutional
right in location data that Jones promised.'"
'9 See, e.g., Wayne A. Logan, Constitutional Cacophony: Federal Circuit
Splits and the Fourth Amendment, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1137, 1180-83 (2012);
James J. Tomkovicz, Davis v. United States: The Exclusion Revolution
Continues, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 381, 396 (2011-2012) ("The supply of Fourth
Amendment violations justifying suppression will dwindle to a trickle. Judicial
involvement in the enforcement of that fundamental Bill of Rights provision will
inevitably wane."). But see Bradley, supra note 89, at 13-14 (discussing how
Fourth Amendment law will develop in cases where there is no binding
precedent or the search was conducted in the wake of the new Supreme Court
rule).
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